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ABSTRACT: 
On this note we introduce some behavioral hypothesis on the static version of Grossman 
model on the demand for health. Three behavioral hypotheses are considered in the 
static version of Grossman model: the status, the social pressure and trust. We show that 
a preference for status and for social approval result in a higher optimal choice for 
health. The same cannot be concluded when considering the influence of trust. The 
variable trust has an ambiguous result on the optimal health decision of individuals.  
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1) Introduction 
The significant contributions to the field of economics of health come, among others, 
from behavioral economics and social norms, wrote Fuchs (1999). Behavioral 
economics provide a psychological perspective that seems to be ignored by the common 
neoclassic assumptions of Economics, such as, status, peer pressure and trust. After 
Fuchs article, Richman (2005) proposed the incorporation of psychological variables in 
the most well-known model of health demand by Grossman (1972). However, 
Richman’s work is descriptive and doesn’t attempt to formalise any of his suggestions.  
The Grossmans´s model of the demand for health is one of the most influential papers in 
health economics. The basic idea of the model is that individuals not only derive utility 
from health, but they are also producers of their own health.  As producers of health, 
individuals have to buy inputs, such as medical care, food and gym classes, so that 
eventually, they are investors of their own health.  
Demand for health comprises two components: the consumption effect, that arises form 
the direct utility of health, and the investment effect, that arises from the increased time 
of being healthy. 
The utility function of individuals reflects the fact that satisfaction comes from self-
produced health and from the consumption of all the other goods and services in the 
market. However, taking into account the comments of Fuchs and the suggestions of 
Richman, it should be considered behavior variables which influence the optimal choice 
of individuals.  
Our aim in this note is to introduce, firstly, two behavioral variables in the utility 
function that have been recognized as relevant variables in the decisions of agents. 
These are status and social pressure. 
Secondly, we consider the variable trust, a well known feature of healthcare as noticed 
by Arrow (1963). In Grossman models’ education, even if assumed to be exogenous, 
plays a crucial role in determining the efficiency of the health production. There are two 
mechanism of transmitting this efficiency: allocative efficiency and productivity 
efficiency. The first mechanism translates the fact that better informed and educated 
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people have healthier behaviors and decisions. The second mechanism emphasizes how 
different marginal productivities of given health inputs implies different levels of 
produced health. Higher levels of education lead individuals to make better use from a 
given health input. It is exactly over this mechanism that trust is considered, in 
particular, we describe how changing trust can affect, or not, the choice about health of 
individuals. 
We show that a preference for status and for social recognition motivates the consumer 
to choose a higher level of health stock. On the other hand, by considering trust, the 
production function of health becomes more efficient which allows the consumer to 
achieve higher levels of utility but it cannot be said anything about the optimal choice of 
health.  
This analysis is relevant for policy makers. In order to improve healthy choices, 
institutional and educational advertising may be a good strategy to boost status and 
social pressure on the individuals’ preferences.  
This note is organized as follows: on section 2 we briefly review the static version of 
Grossman model of health demand. Next, on section 3, we discuss the impact of the 
behavioral variables on the Grossman health demand. Finally, conclusions are presented 
on section 4. 
 
2) The Grossman model – static version 
The classical model explaining demand for health is proposed by Grossman. It 
formalizes the demand for health based on basic idea: health is a personalized capital 
good that deteriorates over time, but which can be created by investing in health. So 
individuals are consumers and producers of their own health. For this purpose each 
individual decides how to allocate is limited time and income. The payoff of the health 
investment is the healthy time that the individual can use to work and earn money, or to 
enjoy leisure.  
The original model is dynamic, but a simplified static version was presented by 
Wagstaff (1986). We take a utility function quasiconcave on health stock (H) and on 
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consumption of goods (C); and the health production function, (H(M)) is increasing and 
concave in health inputs (M).  
The individual objective is to maximize his utility subject to the budget constraint and 
the health production function, that is: 
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where Pc and Pm are the prices of consumption and health inputs and Y is the individual 
income. 
Substituting the health production function in the objective function, we simplify the 
optimization problem and we get 
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Computing the first order conditions and finding the optimum, we get the following 
expression, which is our benchmark:   
( )
( ) cP
dM
dH
mP
C
U
H
U
=
∂
∂
∂
∂
,     (2) 
and where the l.h.s. is the marginal rate of substitution: 
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The right hand side of condition 2 is the ratio of health inputs cost relative to the 
marginal product of health input and the cost of consumption. 
We can represent this static analysis and equilibrium on a four quadrant diagram as in 
figure 1 (as in Wagstaff) . 
Figure 1 about here 
 5
The first quadrant shows that the optimum (point A) is reached when the utility 
possibility frontier has the same slope as the indifference curves. 
 
3) Behavioral variables: status and social pressure  
In this section we introduce two variables that may help to explain the demand of 
health. We begin to introduce the variable status and then the variable social pressure. 
Afterwards, we consider how trust influences the efficiency of health inputs. All 
deductions are in the appendix. 
3.1) Allowing for a status preference  
People may have a preference for being better than the average of other individuals in 
society. This behavior is captured by the variable status. Being fitter, looking younger 
and more beautiful than those of the same age gives status and so a higher level of 
utility. 
To capture this feature we introduce a relative component of health in the utility 
function: 
H
H
ˆ
, where the numerator is the consumer health stock and the denominator is 
the average health stock of the same age group.  
This formal specification was proposed by Howarth (1996) and it reflects the fact that 
the larger is the average of the group health, the lower is status, and so the lower is 
individual satisfaction. On the other hand, the higher is own health relative to the others, 
the higher is status and so the happier is the person.  
The optimization problem of the consumer is therefore the following: 
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which can be rewritten as  
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By computing the first order condition, we find the optimum: 
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where the l.h.s. is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS).  
Comparing this MRS with the MRS
B
 of the benchmark model, we see that now the 
numerator is larger. So it is expected to find a higher level of health stock and lower 
level of consumption than before.  
The reason for this comes from the fact that an increase in the numerator implies an 
increase of the marginal utility of consumption. Given that the relative costs are the 
same as in the benchmark, this increase of the marginal utility of consumption implies a 
lower level of consumption because of marginal utility is decreasing.  
Therefore, an individual worried with his social image would be willing to spend more 
in health goods and services than in consumption. An example of the status preference 
of people is the expenditure on health clubs or the general check up examinations.  
3.2) Allowing for social pressure 
We now introduce the variable social pressure in the utility function. People are 
sensitive to what the others consider about them. A person gets happy if there is social 
approval, while gets unhappy with social disapproval. This approval or disapproval has 
the implicit existence of social norms that work as a behavioral reference for people. To 
capture the idea of social pressure, we introduce a function similar to that proposed by 
Kandel and Lazear (1992), who have first proposed a function for peer pressure.   
The social pressure function is given by )
~
( HHS − , where H
~
 is the social norm that 
defines the level of stock health that is socially acceptable. So when the individual 
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health capital is larger than the reference level, there is a social approval that increases 
the individual utility. The inverse happens when the individual health is below the 
social norm, so that social disapproval results in a lower level of utility. A good 
example of this social (dis)approvement is the way society reacts to over/under weight 
or to non/smoking people. 
The consumer optimization problem can now be written as follows: 
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From the first order conditions, we derive the optimum the solution which is given by 
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If there is social approval then 0>
∂
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S
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 and so the numerator of the MRS is larger than 
that of MRS
B
 of the benchmark model. But if there is a social disapproval, 0<
∂
∂
S
U
, the 
numerator here becomes smaller. Hence, under social approval there is a higher level of 
health and lower of consumption, while under social disapproval the opposite happens.  
This means that when there is social approval, individuals are worried about their 
integration in the society and their consequent utility, as so they tend to spend more on 
health goods and services to build a healthy image than on consumption goods.  
The typical example of the social pressure that induces people to demand for health are 
the beauty clinics where people may under take, for instances, personal diet to loose 
weight, or the enrolment in quitting smokers programs, and also the preventive 
examination of some diseases, as aids.  
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3.3) Introducing trust  
Finally, we introduce trust in the static version of Grossman model. The reason for 
considering this variable is in the essence of Grossman’s model itself, where education 
was taken as an exogenous variable. Education reflects several cultural and behavioral 
features where trust may be one of them. Trust is considered an important currency of 
organizational life, in particular, in the health care system as acknowledge by Arrow 
(1963). 
The introduction of trust in the static model of demand for health cannot be done by 
changing the preferences since trust is not a matter of preferences but of health 
production. So we introduce the variable trust (T) in the health production function. 
Once trust has been built, it allows for a better efficiency for a given level of inputs, this 
means that there is a new and more efficient production function of health stock. This is 
shown in figure 2 with the move from H=H(M;T0) to H=H(M;T1), that is, an expansion 
of the health production function.  
This results in a wider utility possibility frontier, and thus it allows the individual to 
achieve a higher indifference curve. Whether the consumer chooses more goods 
consumption or more health or keeps consuming the same proportion, depends on the 
utility function itself. 
Figure 2 about here 
Trust is mainly relevant for the efficiency of production function of health, either 
preventive, as exercise and diet, or curative, as the schedule, duration and other rules of 
a treatment. However, because of the increase in this productive efficiency, it is not 
possible to conclude about the decision of agents on the quantity of health and 
consumption. If agents are careless, then an increase in the efficiency may just mean an 
open door to increase consumption; if agents are careful then they may just opt for equal 
or larger amount of health. 
 
 
 9
4) Conclusion 
The basic aim of this paper was to introduce and discuss the relevance of some 
behavioral features that are important in studying the demand for health.  
Our contribution was the introduction of behavioral variables in the simplified static 
model of Grossman. We started by considering preferences that allow for the role of 
status and social pressure on the decision of health demand of individuals. We found 
that when taking these aspects into consideration results in a different level of health 
stock and goods consumption. Individuals choose a higher health stock and a lower 
level of consumption, due to the extra gain accruing from status and social approval 
preferences.  
We have also considered the role of trust, which has a significant importance when 
explaining, either the health satisfaction, or the health system achievement. This 
particular behavioral aspect was not introduced in the individual preferences since it is a 
feature that increases the efficiency of health inputs. As so under a situation where there 
is trust, individuals are able to draw a higher level of health than when there is no trust, 
due to the more efficient production of health. However, we cannot say whether this 
result in an increase of health or of consumption because it depends on the utility 
function. 
The results obtained here may have some implications for policy makers. If people are 
sensitive to status and social pressure, when deciding the amount of health to afford, 
then policies aiming at these features may induce people to have healthier behaviors. On 
the other hand, if there is some concern with the efficiency of the health production 
system, then a policy enhancing trust may be an indirect strategy to achieve the desired 
target. 
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Appendix 
We assume second order conditions are satisfied. 
1) Benchmark model 
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Dividing the first equation by the second, we get immediately the MRS: 
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2) The model with a status preference  
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Dividing the first equation by the second, we immediately get: 
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3) The model with social pressure 
YMPCP
HMHSCMHUMax
mc
CM
=+
−
 s.t.
))
~
)((,),((  
,  
00
00
)())
~
)((,),((
=−
∂
∂
⇔=
∂
∂
=−
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
∂
+
∂
∂
∂
∂
⇔=
∂
∂
−−+−=
c
m
mc
P
C
U
C
P
M
H
H
S
S
U
M
H
H
U
M
MPCPYHMHSCMHU
λ
λ
λ
l
l
l
 
Dividing the first equation by the second, we get: 
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Figure 1 - Four quadrants and the determination of the optimum 
 
 
The second and third quadrants are the constraints of the optimization problem faced by 
an individual. 
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Figure 2 – Four quadrants and the optimum after a change in trust 
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